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dismissed absent extending the most basic courtesy of first contacting us or
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requesting a hearing for clarification. Appellees alleged in their opposition to our
motion for enlargement of time to file brief, that they hold sympathy for our
situation, but now refer to Robert's condition in their response as having an alleged
brain injury (page 28, para. 2)? Are we now to ignore all of the licensed medical
provider's findings including Robert's personal physician who took the time to
issue a letter explaining his condition? After having truly sympathized with my
husband over the last years, I wouldn't wish such a condition upon anyone. I hope
that such insensitive minds don't one day wake up to a new reality involving, times
of loss of reality, followed by loss of career and periodic loss of desire for most all
of the things they once loved and enjoyed. Then one day encounter another's
ignorance who addresses their condition as alleged. However, maybe then and
only then can they truly understand the true concept of sympathy.
Appellees brief fails to prove that our case is one that lied dormant in the
court system for years. On the contrary, when considering the record of appellees
inaction nine months preceding our counsel having been allowed to withdraw in
violation of Rule 74 U.R.C.P. and our ongoing efforts to obtain counsel,
considering a worse case scenario justifiable excuse exists. Appellees brief also
fails to prove that we are guilty of dilatory conduct whereas we have submitted
evidence from lower court record that we actively pursued the case to the best of

2

our ability with an enormous amount of effort, time and expense, which supports
that dismissal of our case with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.
REPLY TO APPELLEES RESPONSE UNDER POINT I
APPELLEES BRIEF FAILED TO DISPROVE THAT DEFFICIENT
BRIEFING TO THE DISTRICT COURT LED TO ERRORS IN
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW
Appellees brief fails to disprove that plaintiffs counsel was allowed to
withdraw, in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the month following the filing of
a certificate of readiness for trial. Also that at the time the court stated it was not
concerned in regard to withdrawal, appellees brief fails to address this issue or
show where Judge Himonas was properly briefed of the fact that appellant involves
a disabled party unable to represent him self. Appellees responsive brief fails to
factually prove that district court ensured mandatory provisions, classified as
imperatives under rule 74 U. R.C.P. were adhered to. The record substantiates that
plaintiffs affidavit served as an objection to withdrawal in the lower court.
Appellees brief does not dispute that it is reasonable to conclude Rule 74
U.R.C.P. was enacted to provide similar if not identical protections of the repealed
Section 78-51-36 U.C.A. 1953 cited in plaintiffs brief as being designed to protect
a litigant who finds themselves without counsel or refute that district court should
not have proceeded until plaintiffs retained counsel. Appellees brief fails to
disprove plaintiffs affidavit submitted in lower court, stating that I made diligent
3

and continued efforts to obtain an attorney throughout. Rather, appellees statement
of facts contain contradictions such as paragraph 20 stating "with the Faces,
appearing pro se,..." Plain written language on motions state clearly that plaintiffs
only entered special informal appearances when forced to as verified by appellees
brief paragraph 23 ".. .Faces had yet to enter an appearance on their own behalf."
Appellee's brief also fails to rebut the fact that we never directed our counsel to
withdraw or that plaintiffs received notice of any motion prior to withdrawal to
allow an opportunity to be heard. Said brief fails to prove any motion in
compliance with strict mandated requirements under Rule 74 U.R.C.P. was ever
filed or does record index verify such. Appellees brief argues that "... the trial
court allowed withdrawal pursuant to a written order", yet their order (R. 126-127)
is based upon a September 15, 2005 telephonic scheduling conference wherein no
record has been made available to plaintiffs or was any notice that motion for
withdrawal would be heard. The order states ".. .Mr. Gruber informed the Court
that he will be withdrawing as counsel for plaintiffs...", verifying that no motion
was filed or does the order grant any specific motion for withdrawal as required
after a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. Mr. Gruber stated I will, not
I am or I motion the court for withdrawal. Appellee's brief (App. Brief page 27
par. 1) verifies Mr. Gruber knew of second opinion. The record indicates that in
late July, 2005, Mr. Gruber informed appellant that Mr. Plant would settle the case
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for a proposed amount. The reason for the second opinion was to determine the
value of our case by a third party due to the fact Mr. Gruber had informed us at that
time that he could no longer afford to live up to his contractual obligations. A few
days thereafter, an order to show cause appeared. While Mr. Gruber dropped off
the files, he also agreed to assist us in obtaining the second opinion of which we
agreed in writing that it would only make sense to settle if the value of our case
was determined to be the approximate amount Mr. Plant's client was willing to
pay. That if there was a large disparity we would then confer with Mr. Gruber as
to our options. Mr. Gruber verified in front of five witnesses that he would see this
to end. The conversation at September 16, 2005 hearing is highly skewed, but
plaintiffs were not only unaware of the hearing but also not given any opportunity
to be heard(R. 141-143). Appellee's brief does not address or dispute the court's
statements "Yea I'm not concerned about that.", "Yeah not concerned about it at
all." (appellees exhibit 4 page 4, lines 2 & 4) or does it show where counsel briefed
the court of the fact that appellant is disabled with a brain injury unable to
represent himself. Instead, appellee's brief lodges argument into assumptions of
the court's intentions concerning other matters which actually conflict with the
record, for example: appellees state " To be sure, after the Faces' counsel entered
his withdrawal the trial court held a telephone conference with the Faces and
defendants' counsel to establish a deadline for the Faces to retain counsel or enter
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their own appearance." While judge Himonas elected to clarify his reasoning why
he didn't scrub the hearing (App. Brief page 16 par. 1) after plaintiffs objection to
hearing (R. 130-134), the record is clear that Mr. Plant verified the court's initial
intent for the October 18, 2005 telephonic conference on September 16, 2005 when
stating "... Mr. Plant: And let me make sure, your Honor, so I don't mess up the
order, doing 3:30 on the 18 as a scheduling conference, and they have 20 days
from today to appoint new counsel or appear in person, right? The Court: Yes."
The rules required Mr. Plant to afford plaintiffs immediate notice but said notice
was delayed for more than 10 ten days thereafter. No such order giving plaintiffs
until October 6, 2005 was ever filed.

Paragraph 18 under statement of facts in

Appellees brief verifies that the court entered a Scheduling Order September 28,
2005, prepared by Mr. Plant, which in and of itself violates any 20 day stay
beginning September 27, 2005 according to Mr. Plant's notice (121-122). While
plaintiffs had no benefit of counsel, appellees moved forward with hearing after
having receiving letter from plaintiffs physician explaining "Without question,
Robert has suffered a brain injury and is unable to represent himself in a court of
law. Please contact me if I may provide further information about any questions."
(R. 135). Appellees requested no additional information but instead moved
forward and now refer to Robert's condition as alleged brain injury (Appell. Brief

fs

page 28, para. 2). Plaintiffs objected in lower court by affidavit October 17, 2005
while informing the court of the following circumstances:
1. That plaintiff Robert Face suffered a brain injury and is totally disabled
unable to represent himself in a court of law;
2. That on September 1, 2004, Mr. Gruber verified in writing the fact he
would be there until the end;
3. That during a September 1, 2005 meeting Mr. Gruber stated a desire to
continue with case witnessed by five people, and that there was no
discussion of any termination or withdrawal;
4. That Mr. Gruber had explained he would continue with hearings as usual;
5. That plaintiffs had received no contact in the interim through September
16, 2005 hearing, having been held absent any consultation with plaintiffs;
6. Appellees and the court were apprised of withdrawal prior to plaintiffs
having knowledge;
7. That Robert Face who has a brain injury was left tp represent himself;
8. That plaintiffs had worked with appellee Mock's delays during his health
condition;
9. That plaintiffs didn't even have 20 days to prepare for a Scheduled October
18, 2005 hearing based upon time of receiving Mr. Plant's Notice to Appear
or Appoint Counsel;
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10.That plaintiffs timely attempted to reschedule hearing and objected thereto
in addition to other matters.
Not only was the court ill advised, facts show that counsel moved forward
with withdrawal absent plaintiffs knowledge or consent. Appellees claim that
plaintiffs failed to raise issue involving objection to withdrawal in lower court is
false. The record verifies plaintiffs contention and appellees brief fails to disprove
that plaintiffs were apprised after the fact absent proper motion and order of the
court as required under Rule 74 U.R.C.P..
APPELLEES BRIEF FAILS TO PROVE THAT EITHER COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT OR PLAINTIFFS (OFFICERS OF THE COURT) FOLLOWED
IMPARITIVE PROVISIONS UNDER RULE 74 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURES.
Appellee brief argues, ".. .Faces former counsel, and defendants' counsel all
complied with the procedural requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 74.",
however, the record proves otherwise. In support of their statement appellees
submit exhibit 2 which depicts Rule 74 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure effective
November, 2006, rather than provide this court with a copy of Rule 74 U.R.C.P. in
effect when withdrawal took place (See exhibit A September 2005). Distinct
differences in plain written language exists between the rules. For example, the
rule in effect at time of withdrawal specifically states if a ".. .certificate of
readiness for trial has been filed, an attorney may not withdraw except upon
motion and order of the court, while certain other things must be submitted,
Q

wherein current rule makes no reference to a certificate of readiness for trial. The
record is clear that both counsel moved forward in violation of Rule 74 U.R.C.P..
Appellees brief fails to address hearing held September 15, 2005 or does the
record indicate any transcript is available. Appellees brief stays clear of the court's
statements of having no concern relative to Mr. Gruber's motives in withdrawing
one month following a certificate of readiness for trial having been filed or does it
verify that counsel briefed the court of appellant's disability involving a brain
injury leaving him unable to represent himself. Appellees brief does not address
conversations taking place September 15, 2005 involving withdrawal, absent
plaintiffs knowledge or both counsel prompting the court to move forward absent
required motion and mandatory order which would have alerted plaintiffs. While
the record is silent as to appellees having levied any objection, they now attempt to
convince this court that withdrawal prejudiced their case. Appellee's brief fails to
refute plaintiffs assertion that when the court sought Mr. Plant's verification as to
procedures under Rule 74 U.R.C.P. asking ".. .Now if Mr. Gruber were to
withdraw right now there would be an automatic 20 day period in which he would
be required to give notice "Mr. Plant ill advised the court, upon advising "Right."
or does appellee's brief verify that his advisement to the court was correct.
Appellees brief fails to dispute reasonableness for one to conclude that a motion
for withdrawal is designed to allow litigants an opportunity to be heard and lodge
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any objections. Appellees claim that a motion was filed, conflicts with record
index which is absent as to any such motion while it does verify a certificate of
readiness for trial was filed 08-15-05 (R. 108-110). Appellees argument that"...
the trial court allowed withdrawal pursuant to a written order, ..." also fails.
Appellees brief fails to prove that any order specifically granting a motion for
withdrawal was granted. The order attached as exhibit B, appellees refer to is
based upon a September 15, 2005 telephonic scheduling conference wherein no
record is available. While Mr. Plant prepared the order stating ".. .Mr. Gruber
informed the Court that he will be withdrawing as counsel for plaintiffs...", Mr.
Plant's prepared order itself verifies that no motion was filed or does the order
grant any specific motion for withdrawal.
Plaintiffs disagree with appellees argument that "no proceedings were held
until 20 days after the Faces were notified of their obligation." (page 19 , para. 3,
page 20, para. 1). Record index verifies that following appellees September 27,
2005 filing of notice to appear or appoint counsel, a scheduling order was filed
thereafter which only served to further confuse matters by requiring plaintiffs to
find new counsel or appear in person within 7 days (by October 5, 2005)
conflicting with appellees prior notice. If the court ordered plaintiffs to appoint
counsel or appear in person 20 days from September 16, 2005, being October 6,
2005 as Mr. Plant verified (app. Exh. 4, pages 5, lines 25 & 26, page 6, lines 1 &

m

2), plaintiffs were entitled to immediate notice of that fact not one sent 11 days
thereafter. Appellees tacitly admit by silence that Mr. Plant failed to provide order
as directed and specifically verified by Mr. Plant. Instead appellee's counsel
prepared an order based upon September 15, 2005 hearing allowing less time than
directed by the court, filed during a 20 day stay, totally confusing the situation.
After plaintiffs levied objections by Affidavit October 17, 2005 also providing
physician's letter (R.135), appellees moved forward fully informed with no further
questions. In moving forward in violation of Rule 74 U.R.C.P. and the court's
order appellees risked reversal of their decisions thereafter. Appellees brief fails to
prove that appellee's counsel prepared order in compliance with U.R.C.P.. Rule 74
U.R.C.P. clearly required appellees counsel to "...include every direction of the
court...", yet there is no mention of the court's accommodation to appellant when
ordering "No problem, I will give you the time you need" (obtaining new counsel)
after Ms. Face made it clear to the court "We most certainly do not want to be pro
se.". The order submitted by appellee October 25, 2005(137-138) fails to include
all directions of the court but rather Mr. Plants prepared order states the court will
entertain appropriate motion something the actual transcript fails to support. One
can see why the court did not sign the order prepared by Mr. Plant. Appellants
brief did not refute appellants contention that appellee failed to meet and confer
prior to filing their dispositive motion.
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REPLY TO RESPONSE UNDER POINT II
APPELLANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO SUPPORT THAT DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE

Appellees brief fails to disprove plaintiffs contention that dismissal with
prejudice claiming no substantial work on case for eighteen (18) months was an
abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs can not find where appellees specifically challenged
or refuted plaintiffs argument that Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul
w. Larsen contractor, inc., 544 p.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) does not support such a
dismissal with prejudice in this case. Appellees brief does not disprove that
plaintiffs prosecution of this case went far beyond threshold cited in Westinghouse.
Five prong test presented failed to assess all facts as follows:
Actual facts fail to support first prong justifying dismissal with prejudice under
"conduct of both parties", Appellees argument does not support that they primarily
moved the case forward or disprove that plaintiffs initiated discovery while both
parties moved forward with discovery. Appellees argument that they performed
more depositions is weak. It was their choice and to their benefit, however
appellees did not refute appellants argument that it is far more expensive and time
consuming to designate experts, compile necessary information and undergo
testing, diagnostics and evaluations etc, than it is to perform a deposition. Lower
court opinion cited it appears, not that it is clear forjudge Lindberg had not been
10

actively involved in the case until the latter six months. The record indicates Judge
Lindberg was not briefed of Judge Himonas direction in open court that he would
give us the time needed to obtain counsel or that Robert is totally disabled with a
brain injury. The record indicates that plaintiffs were actively pursuing new
discovery through February, 2005 and was attempting settlement at time OSC was
issued by court. Appellees now claim their ability to move the case forward was
substantially prejudiced by withdrawal of Mr. Gruber, yet Mr. Plant assisted with
said withdrawal in violation of Rule 74 U.R.C.P. absent objecting. The record is
clear that appellees had done nothing to move case forward themselves during
preceeding nine months but now attempt blame their inaction on plaintiffs.
While appellees argue "no proceedings were held until 20 days after the
Faces were notified of their obligation." (page 19 , para. 3, page 20, para. 1) such is
not the case. Record index verifies that following appellees September 27, 2005
filing of notice to appear or appoint counsel, a scheduling order was filed, serving
to further confuse matters by requiring plaintiffs to find new counsel or appear in
person within 7 days (by October 5, 2005) conflicting with prior notice and not as
the court directed to be prepared. Plaintiffs objected to not receiving notice 20
days prior to a scheduled October 18, 2005 hearing (R. 130-134). Appellees brief
fails to address the fact that Mr. Plant filed motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution just days after he had conversation with attorney appellants were
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soliciting to take our case (R. 02-27-06). Appellees brief fails to support repeated
contention that plaintiff took no further action to move their case forward and it sat
dormant for such is completely false. Seeking counsel was what judge Himonas
directed and served as an attempt to move the case forward. Mr. Plant knew we
were complying when appellee filed motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. In
fact, plaintiffs have no question that we expended far more time and effort to
obtain counsel than appellee did in filing a motion to dismiss. Appellees brief
argues now that withdrawal of counsel prevented them from setting the matter for
trial or performing discovery of which the record is clear they did neither the nine
months preceeding withdrawal. Appellee's brief claims their silence was justified
and a showing of patience while falsely attacking plaintiffs silence, ( a disabled
citizen unable to represent himself due to a brain injury or trained in law), as
dilatory conduct and tactics? Appellees counsel is a licensed attorney trained with
expertise in making calculated judgments. Appellees counsel knew or should have
known that it was incumbent upon them to object to withdrawal if there was any
chance it could prejudice their case. In spite of the fact a certificate of readiness
for trial had been filed appellees knowingly elected to move forward leaving a
disabled party with brain injury to defend. Appellee's brief supports that
defendant's counsel not only failed to object to withdrawal, but assisted with

withdrawal and confused matters as stated above. Appellees brief fails to prove
plaintiffs actions under first prong supports dismissal with prejudice.
2. Appellees brief arguments under second prong are just as week "the
opportunity each has had to move the case forward/'. As stated above, appellees
argue that they performed more depositions which was their choice and to their
benefit. It is clear that it is far more time consuming and expensive to designate
experts, compile necessary information, undergo testing, diagnostics and
evaluations than to perform a deposition. In any event, had plaintiffs not diligently
expended efforts and costs necessary to obtain professionals and experts, appellees
would have nothing to depose. Appellees then skip to after withdrawal, while
failing to verify what they did with their opportunities during nine months
preceding withdrawal. Appellants brief demonstrated that the record shows
plaintiffs continued with discovery in February 2005 and was seeking a second
opinion in an attempt to settle the case when the court issued OSC after which
plaintiffs then filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial while appellees brief fails to
verify that they did anything during this nine months they were free to do
whatever. After wrongfully losing our counsel, we continued to diligently seek
counsel as directed by the court while appellees didn't even confer with plaintiffs
prior to motioning the court for dismissal which contradicts Judge Himonus
statement "I will give you the time that you need.". Appellees also avoid
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addressing the fact they had been contacted by an attorney who was then
considering whether he would take our case. Appellees never requested a hearing
or properly briefed Judge Lindberg that plaintiffs physician declared Robert as
being disabled having sustained a brain injury unable to represent him self in a
court of law or Judge Himonas statement, giving insight as to why the court didn't
sign Mr. Plant's order (R. 137-138).
3. Appellees own actions fail to prove third prong supports dismissal with
prejudice "what each party has done to move the case forward" Appellees brief
cites that court "noted that the defendant's discovery efforts were the primary force
in moving the case forward". This fact can only be true depending upon at what
juncture one is considering. The record index is clear that plaintiffs initiated
discovery and supports that both parties were the primary force moving the case
forward at different intervals throughout discovery. Plaintiffs submit that trial
courts seem to rely heavily upon officers of the court's briefings. That when
briefing's are skewed the courts findings can be prejudiced. Lower court records
support that during nine months preceding withdrawal plaintiffs performed
discovery in February, 2005, sought second opinion attempting to settle case and
filed of certificate of readiness for trial, while the record and appellees brief fails to
support that appellees did anything, equating to plaintiffs having been the primary
force moving the case forward at that time. While appellees attempt to convince
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this court plaintiffs did nothing since withdrawal that too is false. To begin,
appellee failed to prepare the order relating to October 18, 2005 hearing to include
all directions of the court. The order does not reflect plaintiff stating "We most
certainly do not want to proceed pro se." or the court's accommodation thereafter
at the end of hearing "No problem, I will give you the time that you need."
Plaintiff submits that if the court agreed with proposed order as submitted 10-2505 the court would have signed it (137-138) but chose not to.
Actual facts fail to prove that fourth prong supports dismissal with prejudice.
Appellees new claim not raised in their motion in lower court, of their case being
substantially prejudiced due to appellants not having obtained counsel soon enough
does not hold water or that appellees were prevented from "pursue any additional
discovery". What prejudiced appellees the nine months preceding withdrawal
wherein the record verifies that appellees did nothing. If there was a calculated
possibility that appellees case could be prejudiced, why didn't Mr. Plant object to
withdrawal? Mr. Plant was aware of Robert's disability and brain injury. Was
this an act of kindness and patience or was there some ulterior motive. While
plaintiff had no idea or experience with what they were faced with appellants
initially requested thirty days, however the court never signed the order Mr. Plant
prepared. We only filed for sixty days thereafter to be sure we remained in
compliance. Upon learning that the order had not been signed, we moved forward

17

with the understanding that we were entitled to receive the time needed to obtain
counsel as specifically directed at October 18, 2005 hearing. We were diligent in
seeking new counsel. Plaintiff recalls one night being in Salt Lake after having
spoken with an attorney until nearly 10:00 pm and then after getting home just
prior to 11:00pm getting up the following morning at 4:00 am as usual for work.
Again, appellees brief having been silent tacitly admits to an attorney we were
seeking to make an appearance on our behalf contacting their counsel only days
prior to the filing of appellees motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute (R. 154157). Mr. Plant had specific knowledge that we were complying with the court's
direction, "No problem, I will give you the time you need.", by actively seeking
replacement counsel. Appellees knowingly submitted their motion and
memorandum to newly assigned judge not familiar with the case (R. "Heading"
144-149) failing to adequately brief her of all pertinent facts.
While appellees memorandum in support of motion to dismiss (R. 144-149)
advised the court of their having deposed experts etc. they conveniently failed to
advise the court of their having done nothing the nine months preceding
withdrawal. While appellees informed the court (R. 144-149, page 2, para. 1) that
plaintiffs motion was granted, why did appellees fail to brief newly assigned
Judge of all pertinent facts being that he the only officer of the court involved

especially that plaintiff Robert is disabled with a brain injury unable to represent
himself in a court of law.
Appellees brief also fails to prove that fifth prong, "most important, whether
injustice may result from the dismissal.", supports dismissal with prejudice. For
good cause, plaintiffs believe that Judge Lindberg's statements "It was completely
within the Plaintiffs control to act, and they chose not to do so. The Court and
defendants have been more than patient and accommodating to Plaintiffs'
requests.,... In short, any "injustice" resulting from this dismissal lies solely and
exclusively with Plaintiffs." were due to the completely skewed briefing she had
received. Appellees brief states the trial court and defendants' counsel were overly
fair. Again, based upon what? The aforementioned does not support these
contentions. The trial court and defendants notices to appear and appoint counsel
conflict one with the other. The court's directive "No problem, I will give you the
time you need." went ignored. Plaintiffs most certainly are not guilty of dilatory
conduct. If anything it was appellees guilty of such the nine months preceding
withdrawal. The record in this case does not support that "... There can be no
question the trial court afforded the Faces an opportunity both to be heard and to
do justice..." or was plaintiffs' guilty of any dilatory conduct which would cancel
out any injustice sustained from dismissal.
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Appellee's brief arguments in regard to both Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v.
Robbins and Wright v. Howe do not support any dismissal with prejudice.
Appellees motion and memorandum submitted in lower court does not raise any
issue or cite that their case was prejudiced as a result of plaintiff s failure to appear
or appoint counsel for good cause due to the fact that the record is silent and
appellees brief fails to allege appellees attempted to perform any discovery or press
the action to trial themselves during the nine months preceding withdrawal rather
they were willing to permit the case to remain untried. Plaintiffs did not cause
their inaction but rather was active with discovery, attempting to settle and filing a
Certificate for Readiness for Trial. Filing a motion to dismiss does not justify any
attempt to move the case towards trial. Plaintiffs submit that the trial court erred in
not considering these factors. Appellees brief did not refute plaintiffs contention
that trial court erred in not ruling on pending motion for enlargement of time prior
to disposing of case. Appellees brief does not address plaintiffs contention that
trial court erred in having not held a hearing prior to dismissing a case with
prejudice especially considering the apparent work which was performed on the
case involving a party unable to represent himself. Plaintiffs submit that the record
supports the court abused it's discretion for at the very worst, based upon the
record of errors in this case, plaintiffs could only be found guilty of justifiable
excuse or justifiable neglect. Allegations of any dilatory conduct are false.

on

FAILURE TO OBTAIN COUNSEL
Plaintiff can not find where appellee's brief argued, refuted or specifically
addressed this section.
TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Plaintiff can not find where appellee's brief argued, refuted or specifically
addressed this section either.

REPLY TO APPELLEES RESPONSE UNDER POINT III
PLAITIFF'S RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS WERE VIOLATED IN HAVING
BEEN DENIED OUR DAY IN COURT OR TO BE HEARD
While appellees addressed this issue claiming it should not be considered for
it was not raised in lower court, plaintiffs disagree. Plaintiffs counsel was allowed
to withdraw in violation of Rule 74 U.R.C.P. absent plaintiffs participation in the
lower court which denied us our right to be heard. Plaintiffs learned after the fact.
Plaintiffs objected by affidavit October 17, 2005. The court didn't rule on pending
motion for enlargement while dismissing our case absent any hearing on the matter
which was not reasonable based upon all the confusion and amount of work having
been performed on our case involving a disabled citizen unable to represent
himself. We were denied our right to be heard and to have justice properly served.
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REPLY TO APPELLEES RESPONSE UNDER POINT IV
APPELLEES BRIEF DOES NOT DISPROVE THAT THE COURTS
FAILURE TO ENSURE APPELLEES WERE PROTECTED UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
"ADA" WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that we raised the issue through our objections
in affidavit dated October 17, 2005 and when specifically informing the court and
appellees of Robert's disability. Issues were also raised upon providing the court
with a letter that was provided by Robert's physician verifying that Robert is
disabled. Appellees now refer to Robert as alleging that he has a brain injury (page
28, para. 2) ignoring the fact that a licensed medical physician submitted
verification to the court stating "Without question, Robert has suffered a brain
injury and is unable to represent himself in a court of law (R. 135). Appellees brief
fails to prove Robert is not entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA.
After Mr. Gruber was allowed to withdraw, plaintiffs did not have the
benefit of counsel to advise or are we trained in the law knowing all the steps to
take but did levy objections to the best of our ability informing the court that our
counsel had been allowed to withdraw prior to our knowledge and that we were
relying on Mr. Gruber's reassurances that he would see our case to end. The court
moved forward with that knowledge. We felt the court initially accommodated
Robert's condition, after it was made clear "We most certainly do not want to be
pro se" and the court advised "No problem, I will give you the time you need.", in
??

reference to obtaining counsel. Mr. Plant motioned new Judge for dismissal, only
days after having been contacted by our prospective new counsel, knowing we
were attempting to obtain counsel.
REPLY TO APPELLEES UNDER POINT V
APPELLEES AND THEIR COUNSEL'S ACTIONS WARRANT
REIMBURSEMENT OF COST AND FEES

Plaintiffs submit that while the record supports abuse in discretion of
dismissing our case with prejudice, it was largely due to misinformation and the
withholding of information on the part of defense counsel. Mr. Plant had deposed
Robert Face and his medical providers having knowledge that appellant is disabled
with a brain injury and unable to work for many years. Additionally, defense
counsel received copy of letter from appellants medical care provider verifying that
Robert has suffered a brain injury and most certainly is not in any position to
represent him self in a court of law. Mr. Plant participated in Mr. Gruber's
withdrawal and prompted the court to move forward in violation of Rule 74
U.R.C.P.. Mr. Plant ill advised the court in reference to procedures mandated
under Rule 74 U.R.C.P. during September 16, 2005 hearing. Mr. Plant failed to
prepare an order as he specifically verified to the court that he would do during
September 16, 2005 hearing, rather he prepared one based upon a September 15,
2005 hearing wherein no record has been made available for plaintiffs. Mr. Plant
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knowingly failed to object but now attempts to claim for the first time that
appellees were prejudiced blaming all delays including those in their sole control
on plaintiffs. Mr. Plant failed to provide plaintiffs with immediate notice of order
he prepared resulting in order having been filed during 20 day stay pursuant to Mr.
Plants September 27, 2005, Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel. Mr. Plant failed
to prepare order of October 17, 2005 hearing in strict accordance with what the
court specifically ordered and allowed. Mr. Plant failed to respond to November
17, 2005 motion for enlargement later claiming it was granted absent any order to
support such. Mr. Plant also failed to respond to plaintiffs motion for enlargement
of time in response to his motion to dismiss or request any hearing to advise new
judge of status. Mr. Plant failed to even meet and confer prior to filing motion to
dismiss which sought sanctions of dismissal. Mr. Plant filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of prosecution just days after he was contacted by an attorney plaintiffs
were soliciting to take our case and then wrongfully represented to the court that
plaintiffs were dilatory in their efforts, and that the case had been left dormant and
should be dismissed. Mr. Plant failed to advise new judge that Robert is disabled
unable to represent himself and that Judge Himonas stated he would give plaintiffs
the time they needed to obtain counsel after it was made clear during hearing that
"We most certainly do not want to be pro se. Mr. Plant was entrusted to handle the
order which he failed to ensure was accurate and executed.
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CONCLUSION
There should be no question, an opposing party should not be allowed to
take advantage of a situation wherein a disabled citizen with a brain injury unable
to represent themselves end up without counsel. Especially when imperative rules
enacted to protect against such, have not been strictly adhered to. Mr. Gruber
should not be allowed to withdraw without counsel first being replaced.
Opposing counsel is a licensed trained bar numbered attorney who made a
calculated decision to move forward with knowledge he had a duty to disclose to
the court but failed to. Accordingly, appellees actions were at risk of being
reversed and justice demands reversal. Appellants respectfully request this court,
in the interest of justice, to reverse the trial courts order dismissing this action with
prejudice and remand back for further proceedings ordering Mr. Gruber's retention
of counsel to allow appellants an opportunity to be heard. In the alternative,
reverse and dismiss without prejudice to the commencement of a new lawsuit.
Dated this 30th day of April 2007.

Robert L. Face

~4^>->
Jackie N. Face
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